Conventional wisdom suggests that institutional development is a precursor to financial sector development. Using a panel of 122 countries over the period 1970-2000, we find that while there is a correlation between the quality of legal institutions and financial development, the relationship is not causal. Changes in the quality of legal institutions do not predict changes in the level of financial development. The results suggest that legal institutions and the financial sector develop simultaneously and are jointly determined by unobservable country-specific factors.
Introduction
In this paper, we empirically examine the commonly held assumption that institutional development is a precursor to financial sector development by studying the relationship in a panel of 122 countries over the period between 1970 and 2000. Most of the prior literature focuses on the cross-sectional correlation between legal institutions and financial development rather than the within variation. Thus, any inferences may be potentially driven by omitted factors (unobservable heterogeneity) influencing both financial and institutional development. A causal link between institutional and financial development suggests that we should also see a relationship between changes in the quality of institutions and changes in financial development. Thus, our key research question is whether, or not, a given country (with its other characteristics held constant) will become more financially developed if there is an exogenous improvement in the quality of its legal or democratic institutions. While we find, as other studies have, a strong correlation between financial development and the quality of a country's legal and democratic institutions, this relationship is not causal. The answer to our research question is "no".
A large and growing literature (e.g. Levine (1999) , Beck et al. (2000) , Claessens and Laeven (2003) , Al-Khouri (2007) among others) has established the causal relationship between financial development and growth. This literature has developed alongside a burgeoning literature that establishes a strong correlation between the quality of a country's legal and political institutions and the overall wealth of the country ( (Acemoglu et al., 2001 (Acemoglu et al., , 2002 (Acemoglu et al., , 2005 , Easterly and Levine (2003) , Rodrik et al. (2004) ). One inference that is usually drawn from these studies is that institutional development is a precursor to financial development (see, for example, Mishkin (2007) ). The conventional wisdom is that a well developed institutional or democratic architecture must be put in place before a country's financial sector can develop to the point at which it may start to stimulate economic growth. Figure 1 , which shows the correlation between the quality of legal institutions and the level of financial development (see data details below) forms the basis that usually underlies the assumption. The figure shows that as of the year 2000, the countries that had the highest quality of legal institutions generally had the highest level of financial development. Nevertheless, correlation does not imply causation, which is what we seek to establish in this paper.
Our primary measure of financial development is PRIVATE CREDIT from the World Bank database and equals financial intermediary credits to the private sector divided by the gross domestic product. We measure the quality of a country's legal institutions using the Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights Index from Economic Freedom of the World: 2006 Annual Report (Gwartney and Lawson (2006) ). 1 Our base sample consists of a panel of 122 countries over the pe- (Gwartney and Lawson (2006) ). 
Correlation between Size of Financial Sector and Legal Institutions in 2000

Quality of Legal Institutions
Size of Financial sector riod 1970-2000 . This panel enables us to examine the causal relationship between changes in legal or democratic institutions, and subsequent levels of financial development.
Although we document a clear correlation between legal institutions and the size measure of the quality of legal and democratic institutions of the financial sector, we find that this relation is not causal. Institutions do not "cause" financial growth. This is illustrated in Figure 2 , which plots the relationship between the change in institutional development and the change in financial sector development over the period . While the size of the financial sector grew dramatically in countries with high levels of institutional development (e.g. New Zealand), the financial sector also grew impressively in countries that showed much slower change in institutional development (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand and South Africa).
Over our sample period, changes in the quality of institutions do not predict changes in the level of financial development. We show that any relationship between legal institutions and financial development disappears once we include country fixed effects or other covariates that may jointly affect institutional and financial development. We also document that the lack of a causal relationship between institutional and financial development is robust to estimation in different sub-samples, and to the inclusion of different sets of covariates.
Our findings suggest that the relationship between legal institutions and financial development is a complex one. While there is a clear association between the quality (or type) of legal institutions in a country and the size of the financial sector in that country, it is not clear that the institutions are responsible for the level of development of the financial sector. Our results strongly suggest that the quality of legal and political institutions and the size of the financial sector develop endogenously, and are jointly determined by unobservable country specific factors.
From a policy perspective, our paper contributes to the debate (most recently articulated by Easterly (2008) ) on whether sustainable legal or political institutions develop in a "top-down" or "bottom-up" fashion. While there is little doubt that a well-developed financial sector enhances economic growth, the key policy challenge is how to ensure that countries have a reasonably well developed financial sector that can effectively channel resources to their most productive uses. Nevertheless, our results should certainly give pause to those who advocate exogenously imposed, "top-down" political or institutional change as a means of achieving the growth of the financial sector in less developed countries. The findings echo the conclusion of the World Bank's 2002 World Development Report (page 4) which states that: "...Best practice in institutional design is a flawed concept".
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss our primary measures of both financial sector development and the quality of legal institutions.
In section 3, we discuss our control variables and empirical estimation methodologies. In section 4, we present and discuss our results. In section 5, we explore alternative measures of the quality of legal and democratic institutions, and we conclude in section 6. The close association between law and finance was first clearly established in the literature in a series of articles by La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 . These papers document a positive relationship between the legal protection of investors' rights and the development of a country's financial markets. The law and finance view developed in these papers emphasizes that the various securities are defined by the rights that they confer to their owners, rather than by just the type of cash flow stream associated with them. So, for example, a key distinction between debt and equity is not just that debt entitles its holders to a stream of fixed interest payments whereas equity entitles its owners to dividends, but that equity holders usually have the right to vote for the directors of companies while debt holders have the right to repossess collateral if the firm defaults on its interest payments (La Porta et al. (1998) ). The law and finance view holds that the extent to which the legal institutions protect the rights of the investors determines the financiers' willingness to provide capital, and therefore, the level of the country's financial sector development. This view follows "naturally from the contractual view of the firm, which sees the protection of the property rights of the financiers as essential to assure the flow of capital to firms" (La ).
La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 further investigate which legal systems are more conducive to the protection of investors' rights, and document that the countries with common law legal origin have higher levels of investor protection, and are more financially developed than the countries with civil law legal origin. The authors attribute this result to the fact that, for historical reasons, English common law has typically provided much stronger protections for property and contractual rights than the French civil law system. In a more recent article, La review the evidence on the effects of legal origins, and develop the Legal Origins Theory which is based on "the idea that legal origins -broadly interpreted as highly persistent systems of social control of economic life -have significant consequences for the legal and regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economics outcomes" (p. 326).
While there is compelling evidence from these studies of a strong correlation between the quality (or type) of legal institutions and the level of financial development, a commonly drawn inference from the law and finance literature is that certain legal institutions are a precursor to the development of the financial sector in a country. In other words, the conventional wisdom that is often drawn is that institutions "cause" financial development. This inference (which is sometimes implicit) forms the central motivation in a number of cross-sectional studies, which employ some proxy for the quality of investor protection (as a measure of legal institutions), and examine its effect on some measure of financial sector development , La Porta et al. (2006) , Djankov et al. (2008) ).
These studies do not rely entirely on OLS regressions for their conclusion of the causal effect of institutions on financial development, and generally use two-stage least squares regressions in which historical legal origin is often used as an instrument for the quality of the legal rules. However, the validity of this instrument is questionable if historical legal origin, current quality of legal rules and the level of financial development are all determined by partially observable country-specific factors. Indeed, La re-examine the appropriateness of the two stage specifications and the use of legal origin as an instrumental variable, and conclude that "we do not recommend such specifications since legal origins influence a broad range of rules and regulations" (p. 294).
Another set of papers which suggest that institutional change precedes financial sector development examine the effect of legal reforms on changes in investor protection and financial development (Bushee and Leuz (2005) , Nenova (2006) , Djankov et al. (2007) , Musacchio (2008) ). The study of reforms could potentially alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns, but the results are not easily generalizable outside of the few countries that undertook the reforms and are examined in the literature. Furthermore, even if the legal reforms precede the changes in financial development, it is still possible that the timing of the reforms is endogenous, and they occur in response to anticipated increases in the level of financial development.
In this paper, we propose that the correlation between the quality of legal institutions and financial sector development arises not because institutions precede financial development but because the institutions and the financial sector develop together. In other words, both the quality of legal institutions and the size of the financial sector are determined by numerous country-specific historical, political and socio-economic factors, many of which are only partially observable to the econometrician.
We base our central hypothesis on the framework developed in Miletkov and Wintoki (2008) , which in turn is based on the model of institutional change advocated by Demsetz (1967 Demsetz ( , 2008 and North (1971 North ( , 1981 North ( , 2005 . This model of institutional change asserts that institutional innovations emerge when the social benefits of the innovations exceed the costs. Changes in the environment, or technology shocks, change the benefit-cost possibilities of different institutional arrangements and stimulate the demand for new institutions or changes to existing arrangements. Since the financial sector is strongly associated with the legal and property rights institutions in a country, changes in the level of financial development change the costs and benefits of different legal institutional arrangements. We thus expect the legal institutions and the financial sector to evolve in concert, as opposed to institutions preceding financial development. Thus, our central hypothesis, stated in null form is as follows: if we control for the observable and unobservable determinants of legal institutions and financial sector development we should see no causal relationship from legal institutions to financial sector development.
Measures of financial development and legal institutions
Our primary measure of financial development is PRIVATE CREDIT from the World Bank database and equals financial intermediary credits to the private sector divided by the gross domestic product. The variable measures the claims on the private sector by financial intermediaries. There are, of course, alternative measures of financial development such as stock market capitalization, trading volume, and ratios of the number of listed firms and the number of initial public offerings to population. The main advantage of using the private credit measure is that it has a long time availability (1960 -2007 ) and as we show in our subsequent analysis a long time series enables us to determine the causal effect of property rights on financial sector development. Furthermore, prior studies (e.g. Levine et al. (2000) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Claessens and Laeven (2003) , Beck et al. (2003) , and Bekaert et al. (2005) ) advocate the use of private credit as a reliable measure of financial development.
We measure the quality of a country's legal and democratic institutions (LEGAL INSTITUTIONS) using the Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights Index from the Economic Freedom of the World: 2006 Annual Report (Gwartney and Lawson (2006) ). An important feature of the index is that it does not simply reflect laws on the books, but rather the overall legal environment as it relates to the protection of the property rights and the overall quality of the legal institutions. The index is assessed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest and 10 being the highest. It is constructed from five key elements:
• Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in disputes.
• Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations.
• Protection of intellectual property.
• Military interference in rule of law and the political process.
• Integrity of the legal system. Carlsson and Lundström (2002) and Dawson (2003) , among others. There are alternative indices measuring the quality of legal institutions an example being the index constructed by the Heritage Foundation. However, the benefit of using the index developed by Gwartney and Lawson (2006) is that it goes back to 1970; in contrast the index developed by the Heritage Foundation is available going back to 1995. Furthermore, de Haan and Sturm (2000) compare the two indices and find a close correlation between the two (close to 0.8) for the year 1995 when both indices are available. Nevertheless, in robustness test, we use the political rights index developed by Freedom House (which is used by Barro (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2005b) , among others) as an alternative measure of the quality of legal and democratic institutions. (Gwartney and Lawson (2006) Overall, we see that the mean (median) value of LEGAL INSTITUTIONS actually declines gradually over the sample period, probably owing to the fact that countries with weaker legal institutions were added to the sample over time. In contrast there has been a slight increase in the mean (median) level of PRIVATE CREDIT over time.
The data for our time-varying control variables -which we discuss in Section 3 -(FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, FOREIGN AID, GDPPC, GOVERNMENT SPENDING) is taken from the World Bank database. The data for LATITUDE, TROPICAL, AND ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is from Beck et al. (2003) . The data for the legal origin and religion variables is taken from Djankov et al. (2007) . Table 2 shows the correlation between LEGAL INSTITUTIONS and PRIVATE CREDIT, and between these variables and our control variables. The results show the strong correlation between LEGAL INSTITUTIONS and PRIVATE CREDIT that we illustrated in Figure 1 . CREDIT), and ETHIC FRACTIONALIZATION, TROPICAL, and FRENCH legal origin. We also observe a strong positive correlation between LEGAL INSTITU-TIONS (and PRIVATE CREDIT), and PROTESTANT and LATITUDE. These correlations underlie the reason for the inclusion of the variables as control variables in our empirical specifications.
Empirical model and estimation
Our estimates are based on the empirical model which we define as:
The dependent variable, y is the level of financial development or size of the financial sector (PRIVATE CREDIT) in country i. The main variable of interest is LI, which measures the quality of the legal institutions (LEGAL INSTITUTIONS). Thus our inference on the causal effect of institutional change on financial development will be based on estimates of β . We include the lagged dependent variable (y i,t−5 ) to control for the persistence of financial development and to account for the convergence of financial development across countries. 2 η i represents country specific fixed effects. Inclusion of the fixed effects are important since our aim is to establish causality from institutions to financial development; the fixed effects enable us to parse out the effects of long term factors that may affect both institutional and financial development within a particular country. In our regressions we include time dummies (µ t ) to account for any time-specific shocks as well as trends that have been common across countries.
We include two sets of control variables. The first set, X consists of time-varying variables which might affect the level of private credit but may simultaneously impact the quality of a country's legal institutions. Thus X includes the following:
• FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, foreign direct investment divided by gross domestic product: Direct foreign investment could have a direct effect on the level of financial development, but foreign investors could demand a certain quality of legal institutions as a precondition for the financial inflows.
• FOREIGN AID, gross foreign aid per capita: Foreign donors (just like foreign investors) may have an impact of the level of financial development but also demand legal and democratic reforms as a precondition for their aid. In addition, it is also possible that foreign aid may have the effect of entrenching a rentseeking elite and actually retard the development of institutions.
• GDPPC, gross domestic product per capita: GDP per capita is closely associated with the level of financial development (see for example, Levine et al. (2000) ). However, wealthier countries can more easily afford the cost of setting up and maintaining higher quality institutions.
• GOVERNMENT SPENDING, total government expenditure divided by gross domestic product: La Porta et al. (1999) find that the quality of government institutions is positively associated with the size of government, however, it is possible that government's dominance over the economy could crowd out private financial exchange.
The second set of control variables, Z, includes variables that proxy for the historical determinants of property rights, and may also simultaneously affect the level of financial development. Thus, Z includes the following:
• Dummy variables (which take a value of 1 if true, 0 otherwise) for ENGLISH, FRENCH and GERMAN law as proxies for legal origins. (La Porta et al., 1997 suggest that legal traditions that emerged from Europe many centuries ago, were spread round the world via colonization and imitation, and account for cross-sectional differences in property rights institutions. They argue that the quality of property rights institutions are higher in countries with the British (common law) legal tradition than in countries with the French (civil law) legal tradition, with German and Scandinavian law coming somewhere in between.
More recently, Beck et al. (2003) , Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Ayyagari et al. (2008) also suggest that legal origin affects both the level of financial development and the quality of a country's institutions.
• LATITUDE, a measure of distance from the equator as proxy for endowment.
Countries closer to the equator have a harsher climate and would have had higher levels of settler mortality if they were colonies in colonial times. This may have had the long-term or historical effect of retarding both institutional and financial development (Diamond (1999) , Acemoglu et al. (2001) ).
• Dummy variables (which take a value of 1 if true, 0 otherwise) for BUDDHIST, CATHOLIC, MUSLIM, ORTHODOX or PROTESTANT being the dominant religious group in the country as proxies for culture. Empirical evidence for the effect of religion on property rights and financial development is documented in La Porta et al. (1999) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) .
• ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION, the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from different ethnic or linguistic groups as a proxy for politics. Easterly and Levine (1997) suggest that political competition in ethnically heterogenous societies could retard both the institutional and financial development in a country. • A dummy variable (which takes a value of 1 if true, 0 otherwise) for OPEC if the country is a member of the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The dependence of a country on a natural resource like oil could lead to an expansion of the financial sector while simultaneously entrenching a rent-seeking elite and retarding the development of legal institutions.
In principle, it should be possible to carry out formal tests of causality by estimating (4.1) with vector autoregressive (VAR) techniques such as those proposed by Granger (1969) and operationalized by Sims (1972 Sims ( , 1980 
where Z t contains all the other covariates in (4.1), besides LEGAL INSTITU-TIONS and PRIVATE CREDIT, and a i j (L) = a 1 i j (L) + . . . + a p i j (L). We can then assert that LEGAL INSTITUTIONS do not Granger-cause PRIVATE CREDIT if a 12 (L) = 0.
However, as noted by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) , it would be inappropriate to apply standard VAR techniques to our panel data. Unlike macroeconomic applications, that often have an extensive time series, the available time series for each country in our panel is relatively short. In addition, as we have discussed above, individual country-level heterogeneity is a key feature of our empirical model; even VAR estimates will be biased if unobserved effects are correlated with our proxies for both financial development and legal institutions. Thus our inference will be based primarily on dynamic panel estimates which we discuss below.
Although we start our analysis with OLS estimates of (4.1), OLS estimates may be of limited value because they generally ignore the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, a pooled OLS regression will not account for the effect of long-term unobservable country-specific factors that may affect both the quality of legal institutions and the level of financial development. However, standard fixed-effects ("within") estimation will be biased because (i) the lagged dependent variable y i,t−5 is mechanically correlated with ε is for s < t; (ii) there is dynamic endogeneity in the sense that values of legal institutions at time t will probably be related to realizations of financial development at time s < t. Thus, in addition to OLS estimates, we estimate (4.1) using the system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This procedure enables us to control for the unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and reverse causality ).
The key assumptions we make are that (i) the time-varying variables (X) are predetermined (ii) the static variables (Z) are strictly exogenous (iii) there is no serial correlation in the errors. These assumptions can be summarized as follows:
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), (4.3) suggests that level values of y and X, lagged two periods or more can be used as instruments to carry out a GMM estimation of (4.1) in first differences. First differencing eliminates the unobservable heterogeneity.
However, it is possible that lagged levels of our variables may be weak instruments for the equation in first differences. To obtain more efficient estimates, the system GMM estimation procedure (Blundell and Bond (1998) ) stacks the equations in levels with those in first-differences, and estimates the system with lagged differences of the time-varying variables as additional instruments for the equations in levels. Of course, leaving the equations in levels means that we still have to deal with possible correlation between the unobserved country-specific effects and the endogenous variables. However, if the potential correlation between the endogenous variables and the unobserved country-level heterogeneity is constant over the sample period, we can use lagged differences as instruments for the GMM estimation of (4.1). The additional orthogonality condition is:
The system GMM estimator thus enables us to control for simultaneity, reverse causality and unobservable heterogeneity. As part of our analysis in Section 4, we carry out specification tests of each of the orthogonality conditions in (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5).
Results
Before we present multivariate results based on model (4.1) developed in the previous section, we examine the univariate relation between our measure of financial development (PRIVATE CREDIT) and our measure of the quality of legal institutions (LEGAL INSTITUTIONS). where the numbers in parentheses represent the t-statistics of the intercept and the coefficient estimate of LEGAL INSTITUTIONS respectively. This simple univariate analysis would suggest a statistically significant correlation between the size of the financial sector and the quality of property rights institutions. This correlation suggests that every unit increase in the quality of legal institutions (which is measured on a scale of 1 to 10) would increase the size of the financial sector by 12.5% of the country's GDP. This correlation is illustrated in Figure 1 , for the year 2000.
An OLS regression of change in PRIVATE CREDIT on change in LEGAL IN-STITUTIONS, over the period 1970-2000, yields the following result, which is dramatically different from the previous one:
where the numbers in parentheses represent the t-statistics of the intercept and the coefficient estimate of ∆LEGAL INSTITUTIONS respectively. This result (which we illustrate in Figure 2 ) suggests that even with simple univariate analysis the relationship between a country's legal institutions and the size of its financial sector does not appear to be causal.
Next, we turn to the results from our multivariate analysis involving the estimation of (4.1) which we present in Table 3 . Column (i) of Table 3 shows the results of a pooled OLS regression of PRIVATE CREDIT on lagged values of LEGAL INSTITUTIONS and other control variables. The data is sampled every five years between 1970 and 2000. As discussed in section 3, we control for FOREIGN DI-RECT INVESTMENT, FOREIGN AID, GDP (per capita) and GOVERNMENT SPENDING. The results suggest a positive relation between PRIVATE CREDIT and LEGAL INSTITUTIONS -the point estimate of the effect of LEGAL INSTI-TUTIONS on PRIVATE CREDIT is 1.5418 (t = 2.24). This result would certainly underlie the conventional belief that institutional development "causes" growth in the financial sector.
However, as we discussed in Section 3, pooled OLS ignores the possible correlation between unobservable long-term factors that could potentially influence both financial and institutional development (i.e. it assumes that E(η i |LI t ) = 0 in (4.1)). Column (ii) of Table 3 , the System GMM estimate, explicitly relaxes this assumption and controls for the effect of unobservable heterogeneity on our estimates. The results show that LEGAL INSTITUTIONS has no significant effect of PRIVATE CREDIT; the point estimate of the effect of LEGAL INSTITUTIONS on PRIVATE CREDIT is 0.9591 (t = 0.98) which is not only smaller in magnitude than that obtained with OLS but is also statistically insignificant. This result suggests that there is no causal relation between legal institutions and financial sector development.
Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3 examine the relation between institutional and financial development when other covariates are included. We include as controls in these regressions other factors that existing literature has identified as affecting both institutional and financial development. These include dummy variables (which take a value of 1 if true, 0 otherwise) for ENGLISH, FRENCH and GERMAN legal origin, LATITUDE (a measure of distance from the equator), dummy variables (which take a value of 1 if true, 0 otherwise) for BUDDHIST, CATHOLIC, MUSLIM, ORTHODOX or PROTESTANT being the dominant religious group in the country as proxies for culture, a dummy variable (which takes a value of 1 if true, 0 otherwise) for TROPICAL if the country is generally classified as being in a tropical or equatorial region, ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION (the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from different ethnic or linguistic groups) and a dummy variable (which takes a value of 1 if true, 0 otherwise) for OPEC countries.
The pooled OLS regression of Column (iii) shows a significantly positive correlation between LEGAL INSTITUTIONS and PRIVATE CREDIT; the point estimate of the effect of LEGAL INSTITUTIONS on PRIVATE CREDIT is 1.2406 (t = 1.81). However, once we control for unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and reverse causality in the System GMM estimate of Column (iv), the magnitude of the relation between LEGAL INSTITUTIONS and PRIVATE CREDIT falls and becomes statistically insignificant; the point estimate is 0.7623 (t = 0.83). In fact, the only consistently significant determinant of growth in the financial sector is the country's GDP per capita (GDDPC). For example, in the System GMM estimate of column (iv) in Table 3 , the point estimate of the effect of GDP per capita on PRI-VATE CREDIT is 36.1462 (t = 2.31). The wealth and productivity of a country's citizens has a causal effect on financial activity, the legal institutions do not. Table 3 also shows the results of a number of post-estimation tests of the validity of the System GMM specification, as well as the validity of the instrument set that it uses. The first is a test of serial correlation. Table 3 shows the results of AR(2) tests of the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation. For our GMM estimates, if the assumptions of our specification are valid, by construction the residuals in first differences should be correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second differences (AR(2)). Results of these tests confirm that this is the case: the AR(2) test yields p-values of 0.57 and 0.71 in Columns (ii) and (iv) respectively.
The second test is a Hansen test of over-identification. The dynamic panel GMM estimator uses multiple lags as instruments. This means that our system is overidentified and provides us with an opportunity to carry out the test of over-identification. Table 3 shows the results of the Hansen test for our GMM estimates. The Hansen test yields a J-statistic which is distributed χ 2 under the null hypothesis of the validity of our instruments. The results in Table 3 reveal J-statistics with p-values of 0.41 and 0.99 in Columns (ii) and (iv) respectively, and as such, we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments are valid.
In Table 3 , we also report the results from a test of the exogeneity of a subset of our instruments. As we discussed in section 4, the system GMM estimator makes an additional exogeneity assumption: the assumption that any correlation between our endogenous variables and the unobserved (fixed) effect is constant over time (equation (4.5) ). This is the assumption that enables us to include levels equations in our GMM estimates and use lagged differences as instruments for these levels. Bond et al. (2001) suggest that this assumption can be tested directly using a differencein-Hansen test of exogeneity. This test also yields a J-statistic which is distributed (2) is a test of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation; Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid; Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous (2) The instruments used in the GMM estimation are: differenced equations: y it−10 , y it−15 , X it−10 , X it−15 , ∆Z it ; level equations: ∆y it−5 , ∆X it−5 , Z it χ 2 under the null hypothesis that the subset of instruments that we use in the levels equations are exogenous. The results in Table 3 show p-values of 0.94 and 1.00 in Columns (ii) and (iv) respectively, for the J-statistic produced by the difference-inHansen test. This implies that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the additional subset of instruments used in the system GMM estimates is indeed exogenous.
Overall, our empirical results suggest that while there is indeed a correlation between legal institutions and the size of the financial sector, the relationship is not causal. Exogenous changes in the level of institutional development do not predict changes in the size of the financial sector over the period 1970-2000 in countries across the world.
6 From Democracy to Financial Development?
A possible critique of our analysis in Section 5 is that our measure of the quality of legal institutions is not an accurate one. The LEGAL INSTITUTIONS index does indeed attempt to measure various aspects of legal and democratic institutions beyond just representative democracy, some of which could be subjective, and an argument could be made that there is measurement error in the LEGAL INSTITU-TIONS variable.
To examine the possibility that this may be driving the apparent lack of causality in the relationship between institutional and financial development, we examine the direct effect of DEMOCRACY on PRIVATE CREDIT. The DEMOCRACY index is the political rights index created by Freedom House 3 and we sample this data every five years between the period 1973 -2003. The index is assessed on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the most democratic country and 7 being the least. For ease of exposition we turn this around so that as we move from 1 to 7 on the index, countries move from being less to more democratic. Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions of PRIVATE CREDIT on DEMOC-RACY. 4 Column (i) of Table 4 shows a correlation between PRIVATE CREDIT and DEMOCRACY, if we do not include any covariates that may simultaneously affect both financial and institutional development. However, once we include different subsets of control variables, as we do in columns (ii) and (iii) of Table 4 , the effect of DEMOCRACY on subsequent levels of PRIVATE CREDIT becomes statistically insignificant.
Overall, the results from the analysis of the effect of DEMOCRACY on PRIVATE CREDIT support the inferences from the previous section. Again, we find that while there may be a strong correlation between finance and democracy, financial development itself is not a causal outcome of exogenous changes in the level of democracy within a country.
Conclusion
In this paper we provide new evidence on the relationship between institutional and financial sector development. The conventional view holds that the development of a comprehensive legal and political rights system is a prerequisite for the development of the financial sector. This view asserts that countries which improve the quality of their legal and political institutions would see an increase in the level of their financial development. We test this hypothesis in a panel of 122 countries over the period from 1970 to 2000, and document a strong positive correlation between institutional and financial development, but no evidence of causality. The exogenous changes in the quality of legal and political institutions during our sample period do not cause changes in the level of financial development. The evidence, therefore, does not support the conventional view, but rather an alternative view, which states that the quality of legal and political institutions and the size of the financial sector develop simultaneously and are jointly determined by unobservable country specific factors.
Our findings do not mean that strong legal institutions are not essential for the functioning of the financial sector in a particular country; indeed it is difficult to conceive of an advanced financial sector without the underpinning of strong institutions that enforce contracts and protect property rights. However, there are at least four possible reasons why we do not observe a direct causal relationship from legal institutions to financial development.
First, our finding that any correlation between institutional quality and financial development disappears once we include country fixed-effects suggests that there might be long-term unobservable factors that jointly affect both the level of institutional and financial development. While we can include observable aspects of a country's culture such as religion or colonial history, it is virtually impossible to observe or measure every aspect of the people's attitude towards finance, law and private property. These unobservable factors also change very slowly over time.
Second, it is possible that the macro-, country-level indices of democracy or institutional development do not accurately measure the attitude of a country's residents (and ruling elites) towards law, property rights and financial development. Our measures of legal institutions or democracy may even be lagging indicators of the actual quality of the institutional environment within that country. For example, Glaeser et al. (2004) show that poor countries often experience economic growth under policies pursued by dictators and then improve their observable political and legal institutions. This implies that for some countries, the observable quality of legal institutions may indeed be measurably less than the actual quality of the institutions in that country.
Third, it may be the case that the causal effect of institutional change on financial sector development actually manifests itself over a much longer horizon that the one we consider in our empirical tests. Thus it is possible that institutional change may cause financial sector growth at a horizon that is beyond the three decades over which we have the data that we analyze in our study.
Finally, there is a fourth possibility, for which we provide theory and empirical evidence in a companion paper (Miletkov and Wintoki (2008) ). It is possible that financial development itself is a catalyst for institutional change. Higher levels of financial development stimulate the demand for higher quality institutions and causality actually runs from financial development to institutional development.
